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Introduction – Deradicalization and Disengagement: Theoretical Perspectives 
 
The idea that a violent extremist can be convinced to give up radical views or at the 
very least the pursuit of violence, is extremely appealing. In theoretical terms, the former is 
referred to as deradicalization, while the latter is called disengagement. Deradicalization is 
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Abstract 
Nestled in the SWAT valley lies Pakistan’s earliest known deradicalization 
initiative for former militants, the Mishal Deradicalization and Emancipation 
Program (DREP). The Deradicalization program was launched following a 
military operation in 2009 against the Pakistan wing of the Taliban, namely, the 
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). The program aimed to deradicalize and 
rehabilitate arrested militants, with what officials claim is a 99 percent success 
rate and with more than 2,500 former Taliban fighters now ‘reformed’. The 
program abides by a ‘no blood on hand’ policy, whereby it only takes in militants 
who have not caused any bodily harm to others. In this paper, we analyze the 
deradicalization program and highlight the limits and challenges it faces. The 
paper also highlights the common individual and environmental factors among the 
beneficiary population of the deradicalization program. This study finds that most 
participants of the program belonged to large or broken families with weak socio-
economic profiles. Additionally, these individuals had very little technical 
knowledge of religion. This study also finds that the program is more oriented 
towards re-integration rather than deradicalization due to its policy of inducting 
only low and mid-level cadre militants. The program also has other severe 
limitations including lack of credible religious scholars, limited financial and 
human resources.  
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described as the “social/psychological process whereby an individual’s commitment to, and 
involvement in, violent radicalization is reduced to the extent that they are no longer at risk of 
involvement and engagement in violent activity” (Horgan, 2009). Disengagement, on the 
other hand, is defined as the process involving a “change in role or function that is usually 
associated with a reduction of violent participation” (Horgan, 2009). Horgan (2009) defines 
disengagement as a process whereby an individual’s role within a violent organization may 
change from active violence to a less active, non-violent role. According to Horgan (2009), 
disengagement alone may not guarantee deradicalization. Nor is deradicalization a necessary 
accompaniment to disengagement. As Schmidt (2013) also points out, disengagement may 
take place without deradicalization. However, disengagement remains a pre-requisite for 
deradicalization (Hoeft, 2015).  
Horgan (2008) also found the process of disengagement to be unique for each 
individual and that the disengaged terrorist may not be ‘deradicalized’ or repentant at all. 
Often physical disengagement may not result in any concomitant change or reduction in 
ideological support’ (Horgan, 2009). However, contributing factors for disengagement are 
likely to aid the process and tools required to formulate a course which could further lead 
towards deradicalization. Horgan (2005) identifies that these contributing factors may involve 
both psychological (ideology, change in priorities of the individual, change in leadership) and 
physical factors (arrest and detention by law enforcement agencies, forceful removal by the 
organization or change in role within the organization). 
Bjorgo (2009), alternatively identifies push and pull factors which determine the 
decision of an individual to disengage from violence. ‘Push factors’ make the individual 
rethink the decision to join an organization, while ‘pull factors’ help in the final decision to 
quit through alternate options. Bjorgo (2009) also names negative social sanctions, losing 
faith or confidence in the group, changes in views regarding the use of violence, 
disillusionment with the group, and exhaustion as push factors, in addition to a desire for a 
‘normal’ professional career, and establishing a family, as examples of pull factors.  
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Della Porta (2009), in his study of Italian terrorists and underground political groups 
mentions that greater support for a group’s cause or ideology makes it difficult for individuals 
to disengage. Other contributing causes which may lead to disengagement include internal 
conflicts, family and career commitments and ‘burn out’ (resulting from the stress of an 
emotionally demanding commitment, or aversion to violent methods of a group). According 
to Ebaugh (1988), the process of exiting an organization begins with individual doubts about 
personal commitments. She also finds that these doubts are exacerbated by sudden external 
events which unexpectedly trigger certain behavior and challenge personal commitment. 
Subsequent events often termed as “the straw that broke the camel’s back” could prove to be 
the catalyst for formal breakaway from an organization. Barelle (2015), based on interviews 
with 22 former militants, identified horror of violence, burn-out and disillusionment as the 
major triggers of disengagement. Hwang (2015) added that pressure from parents, humane 
treatment by the police, cost-benefit calculations, feeling remorse and experiencing 
disappointments can also lead to disengagement. 
 
Deradicalization in Pakistan: Literature Review 
 
While the existing literature provides useful insights into deradicalization efforts in 
other parts of the Muslim world including Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia and in countries 
with substantial Muslim minorities such as Singapore, there has been no significant research 
into the Pakistani experiment with deradicalization.  
This might be due to the fact that the programs have largely been run under the 
administrative control of the Pakistani military, which restricts access to the former militants 
as well as any data related to the programs. Although, popular perception is that the programs 
were run in collaboration with the NGO sector, the study found that to be inaccurate as far as 
Mishal is concerned. Rana (2011) provided the initial discussion on the deradicalization 
model being applied in the SWAT valley, claiming the model drew its contours from similar 
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programs in Saudi Arabia. The study, based on interviews with former and current 
administrators, found that this still holds true to some extent. However, while the military 
planners and designers of the program, which the authors of this study were able to locate and 
interview, did follow the Saudi pattern to some extent, other similar initiatives were also 
studied and a blend which incorporates local cultural values is currently being followed. Basit 
(2015) in his evaluation of Pakistan’s counter-radicalization and deradicalization programs, 
discussed the main objective of the SWAT valley program, which was to rehabilitate the 
militant detainees who worked with the Pakistani wing of the Taliban. Khan (2015) found that 
the main reason behind the program’s success had been continued military presence and 
surveillance, which local police had been unable to supplement. In her research article for 
Hedayah, Paracha (2016) identified clear objectives and methods used in local 
deradicalization programs based on interactions with juveniles who were trained as potential 
suicide bombers by the Taliban. However, the findings of this research are not applicable to 
adult militants.  
In addition, there are multiple press publications on the Pakistani deradicalization 
programs which provide useful insight into how these programs work and their effectiveness 
(Horgan, 2015; S. A. Khan, 2015; W. Khan, 2015; Qazi, 2011; Temple-Raston, 2013). 
However, both academic studies as well as press publications lack in-depth quantitative and 
qualitative data, insights on approaches, objectives, and selection criterion adopted in the 
programs and their measures for success. Most of these studies are not based on primary 
sources and therefore offer conflicting analysis at times.  
Based on the current deradicalization literature from Pakistan and the identified 
research gaps within it, our discussion leads to the following points: (a) there is a need to 
conduct an analytical study into the means and methods employed in such programs, using 
primary sources and empirical data which have hitherto been unavailable, and (b) there is a 
need to utilize information from militants who have undergone or are currently undergoing 
deradicalization to help evaluating the impact on target beneficiaries following reintegration 
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into the society. The lack of available data on methodology and approaches adopted in the 
programs also leads to the question on whether objectives are successfully achieved. In fact, 
there is a dire need to ascertain what the realistic objectives of such programs are in the first 
place. Thus far, it has been practically impossible to gauge what is expected from programs 
that claim to be able to deradicalize terrorists.  
 
Methodology 
 
The study was conducted through a field visit to the Mishal2 Deradicalization and 
Emancipation Program (DREP) in the SWAT valley. The center, Mishal, was conceptualized 
and set up in 2010 by the Pakistani military as the first formal deradicalization program in 
Pakistan. Along with four other similar initiatives (Rastoon, Feast, Zarghoona and Sabaoon3 
for child soldiers) the deradicalization programs were initially a joint collaboration between 
the military and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs). However, Mishal remains the 
only currently functional deradicalization program in SWAT and is run exclusively by the 
military with financial support coming from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (formerly North West 
Frontier Province) Government. However, limited civilian staff is actively involved in the 
program under supervision of the military, including one psychologist, a social module 
instructor and vocational training instructors. 
Instead of presenting anecdotal evidence to support the paper, the study conducted 
field research and applied both qualitative and quantitative methods. This study, conducted 
over a period of five days, can claim to be the first of its kind to explore the deradicalization 
program in the SWAT valley through an in-depth case study involving former militants and 
past beneficiaries. A formal written request for access to the program by our team was 
approved by the Head of Peace and Conflict Studies Department, National Defence 
University, Islamabad, and presented to the Mishal DREP administrator. The request which 
                                                 
2 Mishal means ‘light’ in pashto language  
3 Sabaoon means first ray of light from Dawn in Pashto language   
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was granted by the military administrators allowed permission to interview the staff, 
instructors and some of the current and former beneficiaries. Quantitative data, including 
information on the demographic profiles of the militants undergoing deradicalization – such 
as ages, past occupations, duration spent in prison, marital status, education and socio-
economic profiles – was available for 47 former militants. The qualitative method comprised 
of formal semi-structured open-ended interviews of an exploratory nature with those 
individuals involved in the program to ascertain the factors responsible for their radicalization 
(including socio-economic factors and psychological factors) and their involvement in the 
program. Overall, the sample size included 20 interviews including 12 with current and 
former beneficiaries and 8 with administrators and course facilitators. The qualitative method 
also included a study of the program documents.   
The data collection through primary sources was subjected to a number of ethical 
considerations, including the safety and anonymity of the subjects. In order to ensure the 
research did not interrupt the counseling process, only interviewees recommended by the 
center’s administration were included. The research team was provided with access to a 
limited number of former beneficiaries and militants who were considered emotionally stable 
and low-risk for the interviews. On an individual level, we briefed the subjects about the 
nature and objectives of the study and sought prior consent for their interviews. The subjects 
were informed that they could choose not to answer any question which they considered could 
bring them harm. The interviewee had the full right to terminate the interview at any time.  
In this paper, a background of the militancy in the SWAT valley is provided for 
understanding the context in which deradicalization was initiated. An overview of the DREP 
with its key components, selection criteria, objectives and demographic data of the 
interviewees is also provided in detail. 
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Limitations 
 
This study has its share of limitations, including restricted access and a short time-
frame for field research, meaning a limited sample size of current and former beneficiaries 
was available for the interviews, while almost all of the studied beneficiaries, both current and 
former, come from similar backgrounds in terms of religion, ethnicity, organizational 
affiliation and geography. Since the analysis and tools utilized were qualitative in nature, the 
study is based on the author’s own judgments and analysis, which is open to scrutiny. The 
chosen methodology also involves the risk of bias. Firstly, the fact that the response of the 
subjects could reflect their interest in being seen as rehabilitated. There is a clear incentive for 
the beneficiaries to show that they have been rehabilitated, as they seemed aware that any 
show of allegiance to militancy would have a detrimental effect on their release.  Another bias 
could be conformation bias, both on the end of the interviewees and the researcher – the 
danger of looking for answers one wants. It also is of potential interest to the subjects in 
distancing themselves from the ideology of the militants; because they undergo evaluations by 
psychologist, they are aware of the kind of answers researchers may be looking for. As for the 
researchers, the questions may be biased since they implicitly seek verification of known 
factors. These biases are likely to have influenced the results of the study. However, by 
triangulating the information from those involved in the process including administration, 
instructors, psychologist and beneficiaries, efforts have been made to reduce the likelihood of 
such biases influencing the study.   
 
Background of Militancy in the SWAT Valley, Pakistan 
 
SWAT is a river valley, set at the base of the Hindu Kush Mountains, and an 
administrative district of the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa province. The valley, unlike the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan, has remained a popular vacation destination 
due to its untouched beauty, pristine rivers and mountainous geography. It is located at a 
  
 
 
 
 
Azam & Bareeha: Mishal: A Case Study of a Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in 
SWAT Valley, Pakistan 
 
 
 
 
8 
distance of 150 miles from the capital, and according to the last official census conducted in 
1998, has an estimated population of 1.7 million. The dominant ethnic group is Pashtun 
(mainly of the Yousafzai tribe) and Pashtu is the mother language (Fleischner, 2011).   
The post-9/11 wave of radicalization and subsequent Talibanization in the SWAT 
valley region can be traced back to the formation of Tehrik-e-Nifaaz-e-Shariat-e-Muhammadi 
(TNSM), or, the Movement for the Enforcement of Islamic Law. The movement was 
spearheaded by Sufi Muhammad in 1992 (Hussain, 2008), who demanded the imposition of 
Sharia Law in the region. Sufi and his followers had managed to bring life in the valley at a 
virtual standstill by 1994 (Abbas, 2006). The goal of the TNSM was to replace the current 
governance system with an Islamic one, he claimed (Marwat, 2005). In 2001, Sufi 
Muhammad was sentenced to jail for seven years for leading thousands of local men to fight 
against the American-led invasion in neighbouring Afghanistan. By 2002, the Pakistan 
government had officially banned the TNSM outfit (Abbas, 2006).  
The arrest of Sufi Muhammad meant that the mantle of the TNSM leadership was 
passed on to his son-in-law, Fazal Hayat, colloquially known as Mullah Fazlullah. While the 
organization lay dormant in the years leading up to the earthquake of 2005, it was catapulted 
into the limelight once again. Fazlullah led relief activities in the area, set up an illegal radio 
station and reorganized the TNSM cadres. This in turn coincided with the rise of the local 
Taliban, whereby local militias established micro-emirates in large swathes of Pakistan’s 
Pashtun areas, particularly the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA) (Fair, 2009). 
The siege of the Red Mosque in Islamabad in the summer of 2007 became the stepping stone 
to the creation of Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), a loose umbrella of militias from FATA 
and the SWAT valley under Baitullah Mehsud, with Fazlullah as the head of the  SWAT 
chapter (Akbar, 2016). Throughout the summer of 2007, the TNSM battled with Pakistani 
military and seized control of a sizeable area by winter. The fighting continued over the 
course of the next year with a peace deal being brokered between the state and TNSM in 
2009, acquiescing to the demand for imposition of Sharia in the valley.  The peace agreement 
soon collapsed and another military operation was launched in July 2009, and this time, it 
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effectively destroyed the militant networks and forced Fazlullah and his hardcore adherents to 
flee to Afghanistan. The operation led to the killing of at least 2,000 militants and the arrest of 
most of the TNSM leadership, including Sufi Muhammad. 
 
Overview of the Deradicalization and Emancipation Program in SWAT 
The deradicalization program was initiated with the objective of providing an 
environment conducive for the restoration of self-respect of selected participants. The idea 
was to deradicalize and remove the psychological burden placed by ideological exploitation 
and/or coercion, so as to make them productive members of society. In doing so, the program 
administrators made the assumption that a majority of low-cadre militants were coerced into 
joining militancy through a wrongful interpretation of religion and were hence ideologically 
exploited.  
Within the broader objective, the program laid down further sub-objectives which 
included: (a) achieving long-term peace and stability in the SWAT valley through 
deradicalization of selected elements (b) minimizing the workload of the formal judicial 
system by segregating reformable groups from irredeemable hard-core extremist elements (c) 
reducing the possibility of exploitation and radicalization of immediate family members of 
groups(d) displaying a caring face of the state in general and the military in particular to 
disseminate a message of reformation and reintegration of those who had been misled and (e) 
communicating a moderate ideology of Islam.4 
The arrested militants were categorized on the basis of their involvement and their 
placement in the militant hierarchy. The various categories created were as follows:(a) ‘Jet 
Black’ is a militant with confirmed ‘blood on hand’ with supporting evidence for his crimes in 
the shape of witnesses and testimonies of community members (b) ‘Black’ category militant 
is mid-level cadre (c) ‘Grey’ category is low-level cadre militant.5 
                                                 
4 Program document. 
5 Interview with military administrator of Mishal DREP 
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The selection process bars inclusion of any militant with ‘blood on hand’ in the program. 
Preference is given to individuals with longer detention periods, individuals with a large 
number of dependents and no means of income, individuals with no family links to terrorists 
and old age detainees6.  
Following the selection process, individuals chosen to undergo the deradicalization 
program are transported to the Mishal centre and are briefed on the objectives of the program. 
They are explained the reasons behind their captivity and the opportunity being afforded to 
them through the deradicalization program. The current duration of the program is three 
months and if the management considers that certain detainees have not been completely 
deradicalized, they may be relegated to the subsequent program or sent back to the internment 
centre. 
 
Demographic Data 
 
The demographic profiles of the 47 beneficiaries undergoing the deradicalization 
program at the time of the research, is demonstrated in the proceeding graph. The paper 
profiles the age of the beneficiaries, their period of detention prior to inclusion in the 
deradicalization program, marital status and literacy levels. Out of 47 former militants, only 4 
are below the age of twenty years. Most former militants (22) are mostly between the ages of 
21-30 years, while 12 are within the age bracket of 31-40 years. Only 9 candidates can be 
considered elderly, who fall in the age bracket of 40 and above. 
 
                                                 
6 Program document 
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Figure 1. Age Profiles 
 
In terms of marital status, the beneficiaries are a mix with 24 married and 23 in the 
unmarried category. And as shown by the educational profile of the subjects, the majority is 
illiterate; twenty out of a total of 47 have had no formal or informal education. Whereas, 27 
have some sort of education - and 11 beneficiaries have attained an education of over 10 years 
before joining the militants. Of the sample, 15 subjects have had less than 10 years of 
education. 
 
 
Figure 2. Education profiles 
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The majority of the beneficiaries undergoing deradicalization have spent more than 
four years in detention. At least 9 out of the 17 who had been in detention for more than four 
years, had spent 6 years in detention before being chosen for the program. Sixteen 
beneficiaries had spent only one year in the detention centre before becoming a part of the 
deradicalization program. This shows that for beneficiaries to be selected for the DREP, the 
time spent in detention centre is not a major determining criterion.    
 
 
Figure 3. Detention period 
 
Deradicalization Process 
 
Psychological rehabilitation is the cornerstone of the deradicalization process. In 
Mishal’s program, both civilian and military psychologists undertake an initial assessment of 
the individuals to gauge the reasons behind their decision to join militancy. Besides this, 
psychologists also assess the ideological orientation of the individual and the religious 
sentiments behind their actions, including what the concept of jihad means to them. The 
process of psychological counseling begins with a one-on-one meeting between the 
psychologist and the individual, where he is oriented with the program. The psychologist also 
conducts interviews with the subject’s family and community members, with an aim to 
uncover the life story and assess the reasons he joined the ranks of militancy. The primary 
role of the psychologist in the deradicalization program is in stark contrast with other similar 
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programs where religious scholars are usually assigned the task of assessing ideological 
orientation of former Jihadists.    
The study reveals certain common features in terms of psychological, socio-economic and 
ideological variables. These include: (a) low socioeconomic status (b) large and broken family 
structure with little supervision of activities (c) history of physical abuse as a child (d) strict 
and negligent behavior of parents and teachers and (e) lack of a formal or informal education. 
In addition to these variables, the following personal traits have been identified among the 
individuals based on their psychological assessment: (f) lack of critical thinking (g) emotional 
instability (h) anxiety disorder and depression (i) inferiority complex (j) revenge-seeking 
behavior (k) authority-seeking behavior. 
 
 
Figure 4.  Socio-economic and psychological that contribute towards radicalization 
 
These findings are comparable to a similar study on the deradicalization program in 
SWAT for adolescents, done by Peracha et al (2016). The research by Paracha (2016) 
identifies that the majority population under treatment at Sabaoon7 was ‘not dangerous in 
themselves, but can be made to behave in very dangerous ways.’ As shown by the figure 
                                                 
7Deradicalization centre in Swat for adolescent and child soldiers of Tehrik-e-Taliban Swat chapter  
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above, the majority of individuals at Mishal also share similar traits of a weak ability of 
critical thinking. Two other factors identified through psychological assessment as the reasons 
why individuals join militancy are also very important: they are coercion (fear and force) and 
familial association with militants. Once the Taliban rose to power in SWAT valley, many 
joined out of fear or due to family ties with members from TTP, while others were simply 
forced. “Many families in SWAT were poor families with 5-6 children. The Taliban asked 
them to pay 10,000 rupees or hand over one child to fight for them. They had no choice”.8 
Among the beneficiaries interviewed, only one identified religious motivation as the factor for 
joining the TTP. “When their campaign started, we thought they were on the right path of 
Islam. When I first listened to Fazlullah, I was willing to give up my life for the cause.”9 
The push and pull factors for deradicalization vary from individuals, and are based on 
socio-economic and psychological elements. In some cases, it is the interplay of more than 
one of these factors. Some identify abhorrence to extreme violence; others stated ideological 
differences as the main reason for becoming disillusioned with the militants. One subject, for 
instance, when probed, said that once the Government had agreed to implement Sharia Law, 
the militants should have laid down their weapons.  
“They were never peaceful people. Even though the government 
agreed to their demand, they continued to fight and spread 
terror.”  
Another interviewee said that; 
 “I saw them killing people who were praying in the mosque, 
ransacking houses with no regard for women. They destroyed 
the lives of many innocent people and children. They worst was 
when they beheaded and butchered people. It still wakes me up 
at night.” 
                                                 
8 Interview with military administrator  
9 Interview with a former militant 
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In terms of pull factors, the fear of state reprisals, success of the military operation, death of 
top-tier commanders and love for family were identified. Also, the respondents appeared to 
have already disengaged due to the violence and destruction caused by war which they had 
not anticipated. One beneficiary responded that; 
 “Taliban destroyed the future of the local people. They brought 
pain and misery to SWAT and destroyed schools and roads, 
harmed people and children and this is why the common man in 
Swat turned against them.”  
The significant finding of this study is that religious indoctrination is not the main motivating 
factor in the case of radicalization in SWAT valley. However, it has to be kept in mind that 
the militants interviewed were not hardcore terrorists and that other explanations may apply to 
those high ranking militants. 
 
Effectiveness of the Program 
 
The deradicalization program in SWAT valley has been modeled on the Saudi Arabian 
model for deradicalization. However, the difference between the two programs is connectivity 
with a religion module. The resources and methods employed for the religion module are 
nowhere in comparison to the Saudi program. While various studies have established the need 
for credible religious figures in deradicalization programs, the military relies on its own 
religious clerics for the job. This reduces the impact that the religion module can have and as 
such casts doubt over the efficacy of such a module. The methodology for the religion module 
also lacks effectiveness.   
The objective of the religion module is to provide a corrective view of religion without 
challenging or changing core beliefs. The process of the module, unlike in other countries, is 
not one of dialogue or conversation. The main instructor is a military religious cleric called 
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‘Khateeb10’. The Khateeb delivers a daily lecture to the collective class of beneficiaries – 
there are no individual sessions between the Khateeb and the subjects. The lecture starts in a 
lighter tone with the Khateeb greeting his pupils and asking about their health. This is 
followed by a lecture on the topic of the day. The principal topics included in the religion 
module are the concept of Jihad, Fitna, rights of citizens in community and rights of parents. 
And here is another point of separation from the Saudi Arabian model: there is no 
examination or testing for the religion module. 
Our study concluded that the effectiveness of the religion module is hampered by two 
main factors; most beneficiaries are illiterate and some cannot speak any language other than 
Pashtu. To address this deficiency there are some local instructors who are invited as guest 
speakers on religious topics. However, there are generally no questions in classroom from the 
individuals – it was observed that when questions are asked, these usually pertain to basic 
religious tenets, such as the process of performing ablutions before a prayer. Few respondents 
shared what they had learned from the religion module, which points towards the 
ineffectiveness of the module in some ways. One respondent, a former beneficiary, said that 
he had joined the militants after listening to a sermon by a Taliban leader on Jihad as a 
religious obligation. He said that the religion module had been helpful in conveying the right 
meaning:  
“We cannot call such people our brothers who fight against 
their own brothers and kill in the name of religion. Quran tells 
us that if someone declares another Muslim as Kaafir (non-
believer), he himself becomes a non-believer.”11 
Another respondent when asked about what he had gained from the religion module 
responded that he had learned that in any problem, it was good to consult others before taking 
a decision. He added that he learned about respecting elders and how to behave with the 
                                                 
10 Military religious scholar 
11 Interview with a beneficiary of Mishal DREP 
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young. Another respondent said “I learned so much about religion. I also learned that one 
should be respectful towards parents.” 
Research has indicated that use of credible scholars and family members as credible 
go-betweens is a well placed strategy (Dalgaard-Nielsen, 2013). Meetings with family 
members are another key component of the program. These meetings aim to address one of 
the main causes among the push factors: broken family structure and a lack of family 
supervision. Since family support is the first component required by the DREP for 
reintegrating beneficiaries, it assumes greater importance. Families are also required to be 
guarantors for individuals after they are released into the community. The program 
administrators believe that offering the opportunity of regular meetings with militants’ family 
members aids improving their support system and also offers them with an alternate 
association to substitute their ties with the militants.  
The meetings for families are arranged on a monthly basis and there is no limit to the 
number of family members who can come for the visit. This meeting is also used as an 
opportunity to offer psycho-social help to family members and show the caring face of the 
administration and the military. In addition to the meetings, the beneficiaries are regularly 
allowed to make phone calls to their family members. They are not allowed, however, to keep 
any cell phones.  
The DREP offers a set of vocational training courses to its beneficiaries, which focus on 
offering them the opportunity to learn useful skills which can in turn help them find 
employment after their release. The courses offered include an electrician course, computer 
skills, carpentry, automobile mechanics, welding, appliance repair, welding, vulcanizing, 
tailoring etc. These are labor-intensive, practical skills which grant beneficiaries the 
opportunity to support themselves and their families. The vocational training is offered under 
the assumption that having an actual job and a place to go every day to work is a protective 
mechanism to avoid reengagement in militancy. 
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A statistical look at the employment status of the 47 beneficiaries reveals that a majority 
of them were either unemployed (9) or were working as manual laborers (15) on daily wages 
prior to joining militancy. However, a considerable number were self-employed (working as 
shopkeepers or drivers) and skilled laborers (6) such as tailors, carpenters or welders prior to 
their arrest. The lowest category in terms of employment belongs to those with jobs (2), are 
students (4) or farmers (4). 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Employment status before arrest 
 
Another key factor which makes the vocational training module effective is the 
incentive of financial support offered to the subjects on release. This support is a one-time 
fiscal grant with no expectation that the money will be returned. The beneficiaries are asked 
to produce their own plan of employment in their post-release scenario and to budget their 
needs. For instance, if an individual in the program has learned the art of carpentry and wants 
to open his own shop, he has to provide a financial plan projecting his costs. The only 
drawback of this option is the lack of financial resources available with the administration, 
which limits the amount that is offered as support. Since most of these individuals have spent 
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a considerable time in detention facilities, they are reintroduced to the challenges of the 
outside world through applying themselves in vocational training. The detention results in a 
loss of will power which the vocational module aims to restore as well. It helps subjects in 
regaining their minds and to concentrate on and find consistency in manual work.  
What happens to these individuals after reintegration is more important than what 
happens to them inside the deradicalization centers. The reintegration criterion includes 
educational performance, vocational skills, expert psychosocial assessment, and the family’s 
level of engagement with the former militants.12 The post-release process is perhaps the most 
effective component of the program: the DREP model is multi-layered and involves families 
of the beneficiaries and community members, including elders of the area from the local 
Village Defence Councils.  
Since the program itself is only three months in duration, the post-release gains more 
importance. The administrators of the deradicalization program in SWAT valley provide 
secondary rehabilitation in the form of additional counseling, minor financial help and hosting 
weekly visits. The post-release program is important in many ways: for one, the behavior of 
the former residents during the DREP is monitored in an extremely controlled environment, 
something the subjects are well aware of. Due to this, the true change in their attitudes and 
behaviors from the perspective of deradicalization can only be gauged in a natural 
environment, which is why secondary rehabilitation is so important. Also, the post-release 
program is important to monitor whether the initial reintegration has been successful or not 
and to identify the challenges which an individual now faces in the real world. 
These challenges, we found out in our study, can be wide ranging. They may include 
social stigma due to their past activities, where some community members are unfavorable 
towards their release, despite the efforts of local elders. Secondly, it is important to see 
whether the former militants are able to become financially independent. Thirdly, it is 
important to assess whether the psychological treatment has been successful or not. This is 
                                                 
12 Interview with Mishal DREP Psychologist  
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why the psychological module and social module instructors aim to mentally prepare 
individuals of the coming challenges and how to deal with them.  
After their release, the deradicalized militant has to report to a designated military 
official in their area on a fortnightly basis for the first three months. There is no relaxation for 
the beneficiaries on the basis of good behavior and reporting is mandatory. The beneficiary is 
also not allowed to leave his area of residence. 13After the first three months, the reporting 
process is relaxed somewhat and the beneficiary must now report on a monthly basis. Failure 
of any beneficiary to report will lead to his name being put on a list of absconders and result 
in issuance of orders for his arrest. Other than the voluntary reporting by the beneficiary, their 
behavior is also monitored through random spot-checks and through interviews with 
community members.  
The administrators of the deradicalization center point to two factors as yardsticks of 
the success of the program: low recidivism rate and the number of beneficiaries who have 
been reintegrated in society. The recidivism rate, which is primarily the responsibility of the 
local military units stationed in the respective areas, is monitored by the center. This rate, 
military administrators claim, is less than 1%. “The recidivism rate out of the initial five 
DREPs remained relatively high due to evolution of the newly instituted process. Later, the 
recidivism rate dropped down to negligible limits”, the program administrators claim. The 
low recidivism rate can also be attributed to inclusion of low cadre militants ‘with no blood 
on hand’. On the other hand, the administrators point to the number of released beneficiaries 
who have been successfully integrated back into society with the help of their communities 
and families. Table 1 shows the center’s data on the number of beneficiaries who have been 
reintegrated. The table shows that a total of 1,478 beneficiaries were released between 2010 -
2015. The intake process is not uniform and the center can only host anywhere between 215 
to 260 subjects at a time. The other significant finding from the table is that the number of 
                                                 
13 Interview with military administrator and beneficiaries  
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subjects who have not been released after going through a course is very low: 16 out of 1,478, 
a total of 1 %.  
 
Table 1: Available data on number of beneficiaries of Mishal deradicalization program from 
2010-2015  
(Source: Program documents) 
Batch Duration Intake  Reintegrated 
Batch-1 Aug-Nov 2010 129 129 
Batch-2 Dec 2010-March 
2011 
152 148 
Batch-3 April-July 2011 215 215 
Batch-4 June-Sept 2011 110 110 
Batch-5 July-Oct 2011 170 167 
Batch-6 Sept-Dec 2011 57 57 
Batch-7 Jan-April 2012 139 139 
Batch-8 June-Sept 2012 100 97 
Batch-9 Jan-April 2013 63 63 
Batch-10 May-Aug 2013 61 59 
Batch-11 Feb-May 2014 71 69 
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Batch-12 June-Sept 2014 77 77 
Batch-13 Oct 2014-Jan 2015 56 56 
Batch-14 March-June 2015 78 76 
 
Conclusion 
 
The discussion presented in this paper points to the conclusion that the existing 
program of Deradicalization and Emancipation in the SWAT valley is oriented towards 
individual level disengagement and reintegration of low-level cadre militants belonging to the 
TTP SWAT chapter. The model works on the assumption that low-level cadres were either 
coerced into joining the militants or were exploited on religious and ideological grounds, 
exacerbated by their lack of education. It is assumed that since these individuals have been 
isolated from the militants and have spent a considerable amount of time in detainment, they 
can become useful members of society if their ideological orientation is corrected and 
psychological burdens are removed in a respectful environment. The finding that 
disengagement supersedes deradicalization at Mishal is noted not to have been found 
intentional on part of the administration. The focus on disengagement over deradicalization is 
due to two types of limitations of the program: organizational limitations and limitations in 
terms of resources. The first type of limitation includes the military choosing to supervise and 
lead the deradicalization effort itself. This may be addressed by allowing the NGO sector to 
take charge of the deradicalization program with the military taking care of administrative 
affairs only. This will also allow more openness towards the results of the program. The short 
duration of the program (just three months), lack of financial and human resources are other 
major limitations. Secondly, the military has chosen to bring in its own religious instructor 
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which reduces the credibility of the interlocutor. The lack of financial resources also leads to 
inability of the program administrators to hire better human resource.  
There is some criticism on the effectiveness of the program due to the fact that it 
excludes hard-core terrorists. The criticism is based on the idea that low-level cadre militants, 
who mostly join militancy out of coercion and fear, are not ideologically committed and are 
already looking for an easy way out of imprisonment. However, the inclusion of the Black 
category shows that the military has upgraded its program to include a higher tier of militants. 
But whether this increases the existing rate of recidivism, needs to be assessed in future 
studies. However, even reducing the risk of reengagement for lower level militants can be 
classified as a success and worthy attempt. There are some people who may never be truly 
deradicalized. This, however, does not mean that the deradicalization programs should be 
stopped. 
The program has room for improvement and may deliver even better results with more 
financing and improved human resource. While ensuring necessary safeguards, an inclusive 
approach (including Grey and Black category beneficiaries) is considered mandatory for a 
comprehensive and realistic manifestation of the DREP concept. The psychological 
counseling, religion and vocational training module require remodeling to include dynamism 
and education for the illiterate. The vocational training module adds flexibility to individuals’ 
skills; however, post-release application is still found lacking, which could be supplemented 
by additional programs. The program administrators may need to incorporate a labour market 
survey approach so that skills offered in the program are responsive to the needs of the local 
market. The program also needs to include a post-release support mechanism for beneficiaries 
in addition to the one-time financial support currently offered by the program.  
Finally, it must be added that the success of the deradicalization program in the SWAT 
valley depends on the presence of the military due to several reasons. First, the local police 
lack the human resources and capacity to effectively monitor the released beneficiaries; hence 
the major burden is borne by military units and intelligence agencies. Second, there are hints 
that the TTP is still active in the area, which means the released beneficiaries are at a risk of 
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reengagement. In order to ensure that the risk is managed properly and the attempts of a return 
of the TTP are contained, the demands for removal of military from SWAT should be 
addressed through better communication and highlighting the need for military presence with 
the locals, and by gaining their trust. There is no doubt that the deradicalization program in 
SWAT offers a cost-effective approach in handling a large number of detainees and their risk-
managed release. However, it must be ensured that the program is not a deradicalization 
program in mere nomenclature, with a focus on numbers alone; but actually pays equal 
attention to a pragmatic change in their ideological beliefs. 
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